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Abstract
Using a large-scale online experiment with more than 8,000 U.S. respondents, we
examine how the demand for a politics newsletter changes when the newsletter
content is fact-checked. We first document an overall muted demand for fact-
checking when the newsletter features stories from an ideologically aligned source,
even though fact-checking increases the perceived accuracy of the newsletter. The
average impact of fact-checking masks substantial heterogeneity by ideology: fact-
checking reduces demand among respondents with strong ideological views and
increases demand among ideologically moderate respondents. Furthermore, fact-
checking increases demand among all respondents when the newsletter features
stories from an ideologically non-aligned source. (JEL D83, D91, L82)
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1 Introduction
Misinformation on mass media is becoming increasingly prevalent (Lazer et al., 2018).
A recent example are the widespread claims about election fraud in the 2020 US
Presidential Election on social media as well as mainstream news outlets (Pennycook
and Rand, 2021). Misinformation can be costly for individuals: It has been shown
to distort high-stakes financial and economic decisions (Kogan et al., 2020) and to
interfere with important health behaviors (Bursztyn et al., 2020a; Carrieri et al., 2019).
Misinformation also imposes costs on society at large by threatening the functioning
of democracies (Sunstein, 2018). Academics and practitioners alike have suggested
fact-checking as one of the main tools to combat misinformation (Sell et al., 2021)
and the European Commission has highlighted fact-checking services as ‘essential’ to
counter and deter misinformation about public policies.1
The extent to which fact-checking can be an effective tool to combat misinformation
crucially depends on the demand for fact-checking services. If consumers—as assumed
in many models of news consumption—primarily care about the accuracy of the news,
news demand should increase when the news content is fact-checked. On the other hand,
if consumers also have non-instrumental motives to read news, such as preferences for
belief confirmation (Faia et al., 2021; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Young, 2016),
it is theoretically ambiguous how fact-checking affects the demand for news.
In this paper, we provide the first causal evidence on how fact-checking affects the
demand for news. In a large-scale experiment with more than 8,000 Americans who
voted Democratic in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election, respondents can sign up for a
weekly politics newsletter featuring the top three stories about the “Biden Rescue Plan.”
Our key treatment variation is whether respondents are told that we will fact-check all
stories featured in the newsletter. We further cross-randomize whether the newsletter
features stories from an ideologically aligned or non-aligned news source. We focus
on Democrats to make sure that the newsletter is equally ideologically aligned for all
respondents.2
Turning to results, we first establish that our respondents expect stories featured
1https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/action_plan_against_
disinformation.pdf (accessed 27 April, 2021).
2Furthermore, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to express trust in fact-checking services
(Brandtzaeg and Følstad, 2017), making it more likely that the treatment will generate a first stage on
perceived accuracy of the newsletter.
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in the newsletter to contain factual errors and furthermore believe that fact-checking
increases the accuracy of the newsletter. These results hold irrespective of whether the
newsletter features stories from an ideologically aligned source or non-aligned source.
Our main result is that demand for a newsletter featuring stories from an ideologically
aligned source is largely unaffected by the fact-checking treatment. This muted average
treatment effect masks substantial heterogeneity by ideology: fact-checking decreases
demand for the newsletter among respondents with a strong ideology, while it increases
demand among moderate respondents. While these results suggest that fact-checking
of politically aligned news creates a trade-off between accuracy and belief utility
for respondents with strong ideological views, there should be no such trade-off for
fact-checking of politically non-aligned news. Consistent with this, we find that fact-
checking increases demand for the newsletter among all respondents when the newsletter
features stories from a non-aligned source.
These findings have important implications for the potential of fact-checking to
improve the functioning of media markets. Our results demonstrate the potential
for fact-checking to reduce political polarization in people’s news consumption by
increasing the demand for ideologically non-aligned outlets. However, as our results
also demonstrate, fact-checking can have the unintended consequence of reducing the
demand for ideologically aligned news among consumers with strong ideological views,
who plausibly have a stronger preference for belief confirmation. This result underscores
the difficulty of evaluating the broader welfare implications of fact-checking services
which depend on the general equilibrium effects of fact-checking.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, the paper relates to a
literature on fact-checking (Barrera et al., 2020), debiasing interventions (Alesina et al.,
2018; Banerjee et al., 2018; Galasso et al., 2021; Grigorieff et al., 2020; Pennycook et
al., 2020; Pennycook and Rand, 2019), and misinformation on mass media (Bursztyn et
al., 2020a; Pennycook and Rand, 2021). Previous work in this literature has assessed
how fact-checking or debiasing interventions change people’s beliefs and policy views
(Barrera et al., 2020; Haaland and Roth, 2021; Haaland et al., 2020; Nyhan and Reifler,
2010; Nyhan et al., 2019), people’s trust in fact-checking services (Brandtzaeg and
Følstad, 2017; Brandtzaeg et al., 2018), and how fact-checking affects sharing of false
news on social media (Henry et al., 2020).3 While these studies have advanced our
3Work in psychology also studies interventions aiming to reduce the spread of misinformation. For
example, attaching warnings to news stories disputed by third-party fact-checkers (Pennycook et al.,
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understanding of how fact-checking affects beliefs and policy views, it is important
from a policy perspective to also understand how fact-checking affects people’s news
consumption. We take the first step in this direction by providing the first causal
evidence on how fact-checking affects the demand for news.
Our results also contribute to a literature studying the demand for news (DellaVigna
and Ferrara, 2015; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Gentzkow et al., 2018; Mullainathan
and Shleifer, 2005; Prat and Strömberg, 2013; Qin et al., 2018). This literature has
debated whether people tend to read ideologically aligned news because they have higher
trust in ideologically aligned sources or because they want to confirm their existing
beliefs (Druckman and McGrath, 2019; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Mullainathan
and Shleifer, 2005). We contribute to this literature by demonstrating an important role
of non-instrumental motives, such as a preference for belief confirmation, in driving the
demand for ideologically aligned news.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on information demand (Chopra et al., 2021;
Faia et al., 2021; Falk and Zimmermann, 2017; Fuster et al., 2018; Ganguly and
Tasoff, 2016; Golman et al., 2017; Nielsen, 2020; Tappin et al., 2020; Thaler, 2019;
Zimmermann, 2015). We contribute to this literature by providing evidence on whether
people have a preference for more accurate news. Compared to much of the previous
literature, our design leverages a more natural outcome, namely people’s decision to
sign up for a real newsletter covering current political and economic news.
2 Theoretical framework
This section lays out a simple Bayesian model of news consumption where agents
face a trade-off between instrumental and non-instrumental concerns. Based on this
framework, we generate predictions for how fact-checking could affect the demand for
news. There is an unobserved binary state θ ∈ {L,R} that captures the desirability of
a policy proposed by Democrats, which in our experiment is the Biden Rescue Plan.
The agent, a Biden voter, has a prior belief q ≥ 1/2 that the plan will have positive
overall consequences, i.e., θ = L. The agent can read a politically biased newsletter
that contains a binary news article n ∈ {L,R}. We start with the case of a newsletter
2020) or using crowdsourcing to generate trust ratings can help consumers identify inaccurate claims
(Pennycook and Rand, 2019). While the outcomes considered by this research concern beliefs and trust
in news, our focus is on the effects of fact-checking services on the demand for news.
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featuring articles from a politically aligned news outlet. The agent expects this outlet
to always report L if indeed θ = L. However, with probability p, the agent thinks the
newsletter will report L even if θ = R. Thus, p captures the perceived left-wing bias in
reporting.4
The agent has to take a binary action a ∈ {L,R} with incentives to match the state.
A relevant action could be how much to save, which depends on the expected stimulus
check from the Biden Rescue Plan. Specifically, she receives utility α if her action
matches the state.5 Without reading the newsletter, the agent will always choose L given
her prior belief, which generates expected utility of αq. Now, reading the newsletter
increases the matching probability by (1− q)(1− p). The newsletter’s instrumental
value, uI , is therefore
uI = α(1−q)(1− p). (1)
The agent may also receive non-instrumental utility from reading politically aligned
news. For example, the agent might have a preference for news that confirm her prior
beliefs about the world (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005), which might conflict with
her preference for more accurate news. In our model, the agent receives utility β from
reading news articles that confirm her prior belief that θ = L. Given her beliefs, the
expected non-instrumental utility is then
uB = β (q+(1−q)p) . (2)
Now suppose the newsletter is fact-checked by an external party. The fact-checker
will flag all inaccurate articles, thereby decreasing the probability of factual inaccuracies,
p, to zero.6 This has two opposing effects. On the one hand, the instrumental utility
increases by α(1− q)p because the newsletter now fully reveals the state. On the
other hand, the non-instrumental utility from biased reporting decreases by β (1−q)p,
4The agent’s belief about biased reporting—not the actual probability of distortion—determines the
anticipated utility consequences of reading the newsletter. This allows us to also capture cases where
respondents have biased beliefs. Moreover, by continuity, our results also hold if P(n = L | θ = L) = τ
for large τ .
5An alternative interpretation is that the agent intrinsically cares about learning the truth. Then α
captures the intrinsic value from holding accurate beliefs about the world.
6We obtain qualitatively similar results if fact-checking is only able to flag inaccuracies with
probability τ . Moreover, the results also hold if fact-checking only decreases the non-instrumental utility
from inaccurate reports to β ′ < β .
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implying a net change of the agent’s valuation of the newsletter by
∆ualigned = (α−β )(1−q)p. (3)
This generates the following prediction:
Prediction 1. Fact-checking a newsletter featuring articles from a politically aligned
news outlet will, (i), decrease the demand for news among respondents with stronger
non-instrumental motives (α < β ) and, (ii), increase the demand for news among
respondents with stronger instrumental motives (α > β ).
For example, people with strong ideological views might care more about the non-
instrumental utility from belief confirmation than people with moderate views. In this
case, we would expect fact-checking to have a polarizing effect on demand.
We finally consider the case of a politically non-aligned news outlet. Here, the
agent expects the news outlet to report R if θ = R and to report R with probability
p if θ = L.7 In this case, it is optimal for the agent to choose a = n if (1+ p)q ≤ 1,
and a = L otherwise.8 Again, fact-checking will increase the instrumental value of the
newsletter. However, fact-checking now increases the non-instrumental utility as well
because factual inaccuracies consist of reporting R although n = L would have been
correct. In total, the agent’s valuation of the newsletter changes by
∆uopposed = (α +β )qp+α max{0,1− (1+ p)q}. (4)
due to the fact-checking, which implies:
Prediction 2. Fact-checking a newsletter featuring articles from a politically non-
aligned news outlet will increase the demand for news.
7Online Appendix Section A provides a more detailed discussion of this case.
8The agent’s posterior belief that the state is L is 1 if n = L and qp/(qp+1−q) if n = R.
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3 Experimental design and sample
3.1 Sample
We collected the data for the experiment during January and February 2021 in collabo-
ration with Lucid, a data provider commonly used in economic research (Bursztyn et al.,
2020b; Haaland et al., 2020). The data was collected in four waves, with around 2,000
respondents per wave and 8,399 respondents in total. To make sure that the newsletter
is equally ideologically aligned for all respondents, we only recruited respondents
who had voted for Joe Biden during the 2020 presidential election. All waves were
pre-specified in the AsPredicted registry (see Table B.1 for an overview and additional
registry information). Table B.2 provides summary statistics for our sample.
3.2 Experimental design
All four waves feature two base treatments—where we vary between the treatment and
control group whether respondents are told that we will fact-check all stories featured
in the newsletter— that are constant across the waves. On top of this, each wave
includes a second set of treatments to examine the robustness of findings to variations
of content in the newsletter. We randomly assigned respondents to our treatments in
equal proportion.9 Section E of the Online Appendix provides screenshots of the full
experiment, including all treatment variations.
We first measure basic demographics as well as a range of other background
characteristics and political views. In the base treatments, respondents are then informed
that Congress is debating whether to pass the Biden Rescue Plan (the American Rescue
Plan Act of 2021) and that the plan has received strong support from liberals but has
been criticized by conservatives. We then ask whether they would like to sign up for
our weekly newsletter that contains stories about the plan featured on MSNBC during
the last week.10 To fix beliefs about the stories featured in the newsletter between
9Tables B.3–B.10 in the online appendix assess the integrity of randomization for our treatments.
10If respondents indicated that they would like to receive our newsletter, we provided them with a
link to a website at the end of the survey. The newsletter was published on this website. To accommo-
date different versions of the newsletter, we created individual websites for each treatment arm (see
Figure D.1 for an example). This procedure allowed us to preserve the anonymity of our respondents by
circumventing the need to collect email addresses.
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treatments, we made it clear to respondents that we would choose the “top three stories”
featured on MSNBC during the last week.
We chose to focus on the Biden Rescue Plan because it was heavily featured in the
news at the time of the experiment and demand for stories about the plan was high.
Furthermore, since the Biden Rescue Plan included a planned $1,400 stimulus check
to all Americans, staying informed about the plan could be instrumentally valuable
(e.g. to make optimal saving or investment decisions). We choose to focus on MSNBC
because it is a well-known liberal outlet that broadly matches the ideological leanings
of our respondents. Indeed, in a representative survey, over 90 percent of Americans
who identify MSNBC as their primary source of political news are Democrats or lean
towards the Democratic party, the highest fraction among any news outlet (Grieco,
2020).
Respondents are randomized into the fact-checking condition (treatment) or the
non-fact-checking condition (control). Respondents in the fact-checking condition are
informed that “we will fact-check all stories featured in the newsletter and flag those
with inaccuracies.” Respondents in the non-fact-checking condition are offered the
same newsletter but without the fact-checking service.11
Our main outcome of interest is whether people would like to receive our newsletter
featuring the top three stories about the Biden Rescue Plan. We chose to focus on
newsletter subscriptions because newsletters are a popular way of staying informed
about politics, with 21 percent of Americans receiving news from a newsletter over the
course of a week (Newman et al., 2020). Moreover, by including only the top three
articles in our newsletter, we reduce the expected cost of our respondents to stay up to
date about the debate of the Biden Rescue Plan—both in terms of time costs and search
efforts. At the same time, administering the newsletter ourselves allows us to retain
sufficient control to vary newsletter characteristics across treatment arms.
We also measure a battery of post-treatment beliefs to assess mechanisms, including
respondents’ perceptions of the newsletter’s accuracy, the perceived trustworthiness
of the newsletter, as well the newsletter’s entertainment value, political bias, quality,
and complexity. We measure these beliefs using five-point Likert scales. Finally, we
elicit perceptions about how many articles featured in the newsletter would contain any
11Figure C.1 of the Online Appendix provides screenshots of the treatment and control condition.
Section D provides further details about our fact-checking efforts.
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factual errors, how many articles they expect to be flagged for inaccuracies, and how
much they trust our ability to fact-check the news articles.
Discussion of the design Our base treatments exogenously vary the product charac-
teristics of the newsletter similar to conjoint experiments by offering a fact-checking
service to a random subset of respondents. This has a few desirable features. First, by
providing additional information about the accuracy of the top three MSNBC articles on
the Biden Rescue Plan, our treatment should not affect beliefs about which articles are
featured in the newsletter. We are thus holding beliefs about media bias by omission,
filtering, or distortion constant between treatment and control. Since our treatment
should not affect the expected distribution of articles, our design shuts down mecha-
nisms related to rational delegation of costly information acquisition (Chan and Suen,
2008; Suen, 2004). Second, rational agents should prefer fact-checking because they
can freely dispose of the additional information. This allows us to rule out prominent
mechanisms based on Bayesian updating about the quality of a source that make it
difficult to cleanly identify motives with observational data (Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2006). Third, we deliberately offered the fact-checking service ourselves. We truthfully
tell our respondents in the treatment group that we will fact-check the newsletter. Our
instructions make it clear that we are independent non-partisan researchers.
4 Results
4.1 Fact-checking of politically aligned news
Descriptives 55.6 percent of control group respondents signed up for the newsletter
featuring stories from MSNBC. The high baseline demand for the newsletter likely re-
flects that our respondents were interested in staying informed about the outcome of the
Biden Rescue Plan and saw the newsletter as a convenient tool to receive the most im-
portant information. Newsletter demand correlates strongly with the perceived accuracy,
entertainment value, quality, and trust in the newsletter (as shown in Figure C.11).
For fact-checking to be valuable in our setting, respondents have to expect at least
some factual inaccuracies in the MSNBC stories selected for the newsletter. Importantly,
it is people’s subjective expectation of factual inaccuracies—and not the actual preva-
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lence of factual inaccuracies—that determines whether fact-checking should increase
the valuation of the newsletter. We next use data from control group respondents to
provide descriptive evidence on beliefs about factual inaccuracies in news articles
from MSNBC. Two-thirds of the respondents expect at least one article featured in
the newsletter to contain a factual error (Figure C.2a). Furthermore, conditional on
expecting at least one error, respondents expect 1.6 articles to contain factual errors on
average, or slightly more than 50 percent of all articles.
Another necessary condition for fact-checking to be valuable is that respondents
trust our ability to identify potential errors in the reporting. We find high levels of trust
in our fact-checking ability with more than 90 percent of the respondents having at least
some trust in our ability to fact-check articles from MSNBC (as shown in Figure C.2b),
suggesting that our fact-checking treatment has scope to change the perceived accuracy
of the newsletter.
Empirical specification In what follows, we assess how demand for the newsletter
changes respondents to fact-checking. For that purpose, we estimate the following
regression specification using OLS:
yi = α0 +α1Treatmenti +α2xi + εi (5)
where yi is an indicator taking value one if a respondent signs up for the newsletter and
value zero otherwise; Treatmenti is an indicator for whether respondent i is in the fact-
checking treatment; xi is a vector of control variables12; and εi is an individual-specific
error term. We use robust error terms for inference.
Main effect Table 1 presents the main results on how fact-checking affects the demand
for news from a politically aligned outlet, pooling observations from all waves. Column
1 of Panel A shows the main result of the paper: demand for the newsletter only increases
by a non-significant 0.3 percentage points in response to the fact-checking treatment.
This muted effect of fact-checking on newsletter demand is precisely estimated given
the sample size of more than 7,000 respondents. Furthermore, as shown in column 2,
the muted impact occurs despite a statistically significant treatment effect on perceived
12We include the following control variables: gender, education, employment status, log income,
Census region, and race and ethnicity. We include wave fixed effects when pooling observations across
waves.
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accuracy: respondents in the fact-checking condition think the newsletter has 6.8
percent of a standard deviation higher accuracy (p < 0.05). While the treatment affects
perceived accuracy, it does not affect the perceived trustworthiness (column 3), quality
(column 4), left-wing bias (column 5), complexity (column 6), or entertainment value
(column 7) of the newsletter. Our first main result can thus be summarized as follows:
Result 1. On average, people have a muted demand for fact-checking of news from
politically aligned sources, despite a significant positive effect of fact-checking on the
perceived accuracy of the newsletter.
[Insert Table 1 here]
One recurring concern about online studies is potentially lower levels of attention
among respondents compared to laboratory experiments. To test for the role of attention,
we examine treatment effects separately by whether respondents passed a simple
attention check on the beginning of the survey.13 Panel B and Panel C of Table 1 show
results separately for attentive and inattentive respondents, respectively. As shown in
column 2, the treatment effect on perceived accuracy is over twice as large for attentive
respondents compared to the full sample. Moreover, among attentive respondents,
we find a statistically significant treatment effect on higher perceived trustworthiness
(p < 0.05, column 3 of Panel B) and a marginally significant treatment effect on lower
perceived left-wing bias (p < 0.10, column 5 of Panel B). Despite a significant and
stronger first stage on both accuracy and trust, we still find a muted effect of fact-
checking on demand for the newsletter. These results underscore that the muted impact
of demand is unlikely to be driven by weak first-stage effects of the fact-checking
treatment on perceptions about the newsletter characteristics. Turning to inattentive
respondents (Panel C), we consistently find non-significant effects close to zero for
all outcomes, including on newsletter demand, perceived accuracy and trust in the
newsletter (columns 1–3). These results strongly suggest lower data quality for the
subset of inattentive respondents. We, therefore, focus on attentive respondents for the
rest of the paper to circumvent that potential null results are driven by noise created by
inattentive respondents.14
13Online Appendix Section E.1.1 provides a screenshot of the attention check, which 56 percent of
our respondents passed.
14Indeed, many experimental studies conducted using similar online samples usually screen out
inattentive respondents from the outset (e.g., Enke and Graeber, 2019; Haaland and Roth, 2020).
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Robustness We cross-randomized several treatments to assess the robustness of our
findings to differences in the content of the newsletter. Appendix Table B.14 shows that
our main result of a muted demand for fact-checking of ideologically aligned news is
robust to (i) varying the framing of the Biden Rescue Plan (column 1), (ii) varying the
perceived salience of the financial implications of the plan for our respondents (column
2), and (iii) varying the type of articles covered in the newsletter (column 3). Appendix
Section E contains the full experimental instructions.
Heterogeneity by ideology As discussed in Section 2, respondents with strong ide-
ological views might assign a larger weight to non-instrumental motives, such as a
preference for belief confirmation, than respondents with moderate views. In this case,
we would expect the fact-checking treatment to have an opposite effect on newsletter
demand for consumers with strong and moderate ideological views. To categorize the
strength of people’s ideological views, we use a pre-treatment question where people
report their ideology on a five-point scale from “very liberal” to “very conservative.”
Throughout the paper, we refer to “very liberal” respondents as those with strong ideo-
logical views and to the remaining respondents as moderate respondents.15 Respondents
with strong ideological views hold significantly more extreme policy attitudes than
moderate respondents and are, for instance, over 50 percent more likely to “strongly
support” the Biden Rescue Plan.
Table 2 shows heterogeneity in treatment effects by ideological views (these effects
are also displayed graphically in Panel A of Figure 1). Panel A of Table 2 shows
treatment effects for respondents with strong ideological views. These respondents
significantly reduce their demand for the newsletter by 6.2 percentage points in response
to the fact-checking treatment (p < 0.05, column 1). This effect arises even though these
respondents perceive the fact-checked newsletter as 11.8 percent of a standard deviation
more accurate (p < 0.05, column 2). These respondents also perceive the fact-checked
newsletter as less left-wing biased (p < 0.10, column 5), providing suggestive evidence
in favor of a mechanism where respondents with strong ideological views trade off
accuracy against non-instrumental utility. Panel B of Table 2 shows treatment effects
for respondents with moderate views. These respondents significantly increase their
1531.8 percent of our sample rated themselves as “very liberal.” Furthermore, consistent with our
restriction to focus on respondents who voted for Joe Biden in the 2020 presidential election, 93.7% of
our respondents rated themselves as either “liberal” or “very liberal”.
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demand for the newsletter by 4.5 percentage points in response to the fact-checking
treatment (p < 0.05, column 1). They also perceive the fact-checked newsletter as 14.6
percent of a standard deviation more accurate (p < 0.01, column 1) and 9.7 percent of a
standard deviation more trustworthy (p < 0.05, column 3).
Comparing treatment effects in Panel B and Panel C of Table 2 shows that we
can reject equality of treatment effects on newsletter demand between respondents
with strong and moderate ideological views at any conventional level of statistical
significance (column 1). By contrast, there are no statistically significant differences in
treatment effects between the two groups on beliefs about newsletter characteristics,
such as accuracy and trust (columns 2–7). Our second main result follows.
Result 2. Respondents with strong and moderate ideological views respond differently
to fact-checking: Despite similar first stage effects on beliefs about newsletter character-
istics, respondents with strong ideological views reduce their demand for the newsletter
by 6.2 percentage points in response to the fact-checking treatment while moderate
respondents increase their demand for the newsletter by 4.5 percentage points.
[Insert Table 2 here]
4.2 Fact-checking of politically non-aligned news
We next study how fact-checking affects people’s demand for news from a politically
non-aligned outlet. While our theoretical framework shows that fact-checking creates
a trade-off between accuracy and non-instrumental motives when news articles are
selected from a politically aligned outlet, this trade-off disappears when news articles are
selected from a politically non-aligned outlet. We would therefore expect fact-checking
to increase demand for a newsletter featuring stories from a politically non-aligned
outlet (Prediction 2 of Section 2). To test this prediction, we conducted an experiment
where the newsletter features news articles from Fox News instead of MSNBC while
at the same time holding constant all other features of the design (wave 3, n = 1,028).
We choose to focus on Fox News because it is a well-known outlet with a conservative
learning. Indeed, in a representative survey, over 90 percent of Americans who identify
Fox News as their primary source of political news are Republicans or lean towards the
Republican party, the highest fraction among any news outlet (Grieco, 2020).
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Descriptives As expected, we observe a lower demand for news from Fox News: 44.5
percent of control group respondents sign up for the newsletter featuring stories from
Fox News, compared to 55.6 percent for MSNBC.16 Furthermore, newsletter demand
correlates strongly with the perceived accuracy of Fox News (as shown in Figure C.12).
We next use data from control group respondents to provide descriptive data on beliefs
about factual inaccuracies in news articles from Fox News. More than two-thirds of
the control group respondents expect at least one article to contain factual errors and
40 percent expect every article to contain some errors (Figure C.3a). Furthermore, 60
percent of the respondents express having at least some trust in our ability to fact-check
articles from Fox News (Figure C.3b).17 These descriptives demonstrate a large scope
for fact-checking to improve the perceived accuracy of the newsletter.
Main results Panel A of Table 3 shows the treatment effects on the newsletter featur-
ing stories from Fox News. Column 1 shows that the fact-checking treatment increases
newsletter demand by 7.9 percentage points (p < 0.01). This corresponds to a 18
percent increase in demand relative to a control mean of 44.5 percent. Respondents
in the fact-checking condition also perceive the newsletter to be 16.3 of a standard
deviation more accurate (p < 0.01).
Panel B and C of Table 3, which present results separately for attentive and inatten-
tive respondents, demonstrate that our treatment effects are primarily driven by attentive
respondents. Among attentive respondents, the fact-checking treatment increases
newsletter demand by 10 percentage points (p < 0.05, column 1) and the perceived
accuracy of the newsletter by 23.1 percent of a standard deviation (p < 0.01, column
2). By contrast, we observe small and statistically insignificant treatment effects on
newsletter demand and perceived accuracy among inattentive respondents.
Heterogeneity by ideology Table B.12 present treatment effects for attentive respon-
dents with strong ideology (Panel A) and moderate ideology (Panel B). While this
sample restriction substantially reduces our power to detect statistically significant
effects, especially for respondents with strong ideology, we find broadly similar patterns
16Among attentive respondents, only 34.3 percent sign up for the newsletter featuring stories from
Fox News (compared to 49.7 percent for MSNBC).
17These patterns are more even pronounced if we focus on the subsample of attentive respondents, as
shown in Figure C.4c and C.4d.
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in both groups. As shown in column 1, treated respondents with strong and moder-
ate ideology increase their demand for the newsletter by 6.4 percentage points and
9.5 percentage points, respectively. These results are consistent with our theoretical
framework, which predicts that both groups should increase their demand as there is
no trade-off between instrumental and non-instrumental motives with news from a
politically non-aligned source (these results are also shown graphically in Panel B of
Figure 1). Furthermore, as shown in column 2, the first stage on perceived accuracy is
also similar across both groups. This leads to our third main result:
Result 3. All respondents, irrespective of their ideological leanings, increase their
demand for the newsletter from a politically non-aligned source in response to the
fact-checking treatment.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
[Insert Table 3 here]
4.3 Alternative mechanisms
In this section, we discuss a series of mechanisms, which might be operating in this
experiment, but which are unlikely to explain the patterns in our data.
Confidence and ideology Empirically, we find that both respondents with moderate
and strong ideology expect a more accurate newsletter if it is fact-checked (column
2 of Table 2). However, respondents with strong ideology, who hold strong prior
belief about the world, might be very confident that they can detect any inaccuracies in
reporting themselves. While overconfidence might decrease the perceived added-value
of fact-checking services, it cannot strictly decrease the valuation of the newsletter.
This would require an additional feature such as a large cost of processing information.
Updating about source quality People might update about the quality of the under-
lying source of the newsletter when they learn that the source is fact-checked. For
instance, people could think that fact-checking implies that the underlying source is of
low quality (hence the need for a fact-check). To address these potential concerns, we
elicited expected errors from the underlying source of the newsletter. If anything, we
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actually see that our respondents in the fact-check condition expect fewer errors from
the underlying source (Table B.16 in the online Appendix).
Cognitive constraints Furthermore, since fact-checking in our context does not affect
the selection of articles in the newsletter, we can—to the extent that fact-checking itself
is not perceived as cognitively costly—change beliefs about accuracy while holding
cognitive costs constant. Even if our respondents perceive fact-checking as cognitively
costly (which we consider unlikely as column 6 of Table 1 shows that fact-checking
does not affect the perceived complexity of the newsletter), the heterogeneity by the
strength of people’s ideological views as well as the heterogeneity by the ideological
leanings of the outlet suggest that cognitive constraints are not driving the observed
patterns in our data.
Demand effects While the between-design should not make it salient that we are
interested in how fact-checking affects newsletter demand, we cannot rule out that some
respondents nonetheless realized that we were studying fact-checking and adjusted their
behavior accordingly. However, the heterogeneity in treatment effects by the strength
of people’s ideological views as well as the heterogeneity by the ideological leanings
of the outlet suggest that demand effects do not play a major role in our experiment.
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that demand effects are not a major concern in
online experiments (de Quidt et al., 2018).
4.4 Expert survey
Lastly, we wanted to examine how experts expect the demand for the newsletter to
change in response to fact-checking of the newsletter content. For this purpose, we
conducted a survey in March 2021 among leading academic researchers in the area
of media and behavioral economics. We compiled a list of 93 experts. Our final
sample consists of 65 experts, corresponding to a response rate of 70 percent.18 After
providing the expert participants with information about the sample, design, and the
experimental instructions (including screenshots of the key treatment screens), we elicit
their predictions about the effect of fact-checking on the demand for news for MSNBC
1825% of these experts are Full Professor, 15% are Associate Professor, 34% percent are Assistant
Professors, 14% are postdocs, and 12% of respondents in our sample are PhD Students.
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and Fox News. For both outlets, we inform experts about baseline demand for the
newsletter among respondents in the control group and then elicit their beliefs about
newsletter demand among respondents in the treatment group.
Figure C.10 of the Online Appendix shows the results from expert survey. As shown
in Figure C.10a, we observe a wide dispersion in expert beliefs about the impact of fact-
checking on the demand for news with a mean absolute deviation of seven percentage
points between expert opinions and actual treatment effects. The heterogeneity in
expert beliefs suggests that there is substantial expert disagreement about the relative
importance of different motives to read the news, such as the importance of accuracy
motives versus belief utility motives. As shown in Figure C.10b, expert beliefs on
average closely resemble the actual treatment effects, demonstrating a clear wisdom-of-
the-crowds effect among experts.
5 Concluding remarks
We study how fact-checking affects the demand for news. Our respondents have a
muted demand for fact-checking of politically aligned news, even though fact-checking
increases the perceived accuracy of the news. This average effect masks substantial
heterogeneity: Fact-checking decreases demand for politically aligned news among
respondents with strong ideological views and increases demand among moderate
respondents. Furthermore, fact-checking increases the demand for ideologically non-
aligned news for all respondents irrespective of their ideological leanings.
Our findings have several implications for policymakers interested in using fact-
checking services as a policy tool. If the goal of the fact-checking policy is to increase
the demand for news, the campaign is unlikely to be very successful because some
consumers face a trade-off between accuracy and utility from belief confirmation. For
consumers with strong ideological leanings, who plausibly have a stronger belief utility
motive than others, fact-checking services might decrease news demand or even make
them switch towards a more slanted news outlet not covered by the fact-checking service.
On the other hand, if the goal is to reduce polarization in people’s news consumption,
the policy might be more successful as fact-checking might make consumers more
willing to read news from non-ideologically aligned news outlets. However, whether
the policy is successful in reducing polarization depends on whether fact-checking
16
mainly changes people’s news consumption towards more ideologically aligned outlets
that are not covered by the fact-checking policy or towards less ideologically aligned
outlets covered by the policy. While our study provides a first step in understanding
how fact-checking affects the demand for news, we think more research is needed to
understand the general equilibrium effects of fact-checking services.
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 Panel B: Fox News
Note: This figure shows newsletter demand for MSNBC (Panel A) and Fox News (Panel B) among attentive respondents. Newsletter demand
is shown separately by treatment group for the full sample, respondents with a strong ideology, and for respondents with a moderate ideology.
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Table 1: Main results: MSNBC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
News demand Accuracy Trust Quality Left-wing bias Complexity Entertainment
Panel A: Full sample
Treatment 0.003 0.068*** 0.018 0.021 -0.020 0.014 0.001
(0.011) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
N 7,371 7,294 7,294 7,294 7,294 7,294 7,294
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.556 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B: Attentive
Treatment 0.014 0.143*** 0.087*** 0.049 -0.051* 0.035 0.023
(0.016) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
N 4,109 4,069 4,069 4,069 4,069 4,069 4,069
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.497 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel C: Inattentive
Treatment -0.009 -0.002 -0.051 -0.000 0.007 -0.005 -0.023
(0.016) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
N 3,262 3,225 3,225 3,225 3,225 3,225 3,225
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.631 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: This table shows OLS regression estimates where the dependent variables are demand for the newsletter and different
post-treatment beliefs about the newsletter. All regressions use respondents that were offered a newsletter featuring MSNBC
articles. “Treatment” is a binary variable taking value one if the articles in the newsletter are fact-checked. “Accuracy” of the
newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very inaccurate” to “Very accurate”. “Trust” is the trustworthiness of the
newsletter and measured on a 5-point scale from “Not trustworthy at all” to “Very trustworthy”. “Quality” of the newsletter is
measured on a 5-point scale from “Very low quality” to “Very high quality”. “Left-wing bias” is measured on a 5-point scale
from “Very right-wing biased” to “Very left-wing biased”. “Complexity” of the newsletter articles is measured on a 5-point
scale from “Very simple” to “Very complex”. “Entertainment” of the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Not
entertaining at all” to “Very entertaining”.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2: Heterogeneous treatment effects between respondents with strong and moderate views: MSNBC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
News demand Accuracy Trust Quality Left-wing bias Complexity Entertainment
Panel A: Strong ideology
Treatment (a) -0.062** 0.118** 0.043 0.016 -0.094* 0.027 0.023
(0.027) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052) (0.054) (0.055) (0.052)
N 1,307 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.597 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B: Moderate ideology
Treatment (b) 0.045** 0.146*** 0.097** 0.051 -0.006 0.051 0.010
(0.019) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
N 2,802 2,770 2,770 2,770 2,770 2,770 2,770
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.450 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value: a = b 0.001 0.806 0.495 0.638 0.141 0.779 0.808
Note: This table uses data from attentive respondents and shows OLS regression estimates where the dependent variables are demand
for the newsletter and different post-treatment beliefs about the newsletter. All regressions use respondents that were offered a
newsletter featuring MSNBC articles. Panel A shows results for respondents with a strong ideology and Panel B shows results
for respondents with a moderate ideology. “Treatment” is a binary variable taking value one if the articles in the newsletter are
fact-checked. “Accuracy” of the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very inaccurate” to “Very accurate”. “Trust” is the
trustworthiness of the newsletter and measured on a 5-point scale from “Not trustworthy at all” to “Very trustworthy”. “Quality” of
the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very low quality” to “Very high quality”. “Left-wing bias” is measured on a
5-point scale from “Very right-wing biased” to “Very left-wing biased”. “Complexity” of the newsletter articles is measured on a
5-point scale from “Very simple” to “Very complex”. “Entertainment” of the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Not
entertaining at all” to “Very entertaining”.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Main results: Fox News
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
News demand Accuracy Trust Quality Left-wing bias Complexity Entertainment
Panel A: Full sample
Treatment 0.079*** 0.163*** 0.165*** 0.177*** -0.140** -0.113* 0.144**
(0.030) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.062) (0.061)
N 1,028 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.445 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B: Attentive
Treatment 0.100** 0.231*** 0.152* 0.177** -0.124 -0.076 0.107
(0.041) (0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.081) (0.086) (0.087)
N 558 548 548 548 548 548 548
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.343 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel C: Inattentive
Treatment 0.048 0.057 0.156* 0.151* -0.170* -0.146 0.168*
(0.044) (0.088) (0.086) (0.088) (0.088) (0.091) (0.086)
N 470 462 462 462 462 462 462
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.569 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: This table shows OLS regression estimates where the dependent variables are demand for the newsletter and different
post-treatment beliefs about the newsletter. All regressions use respondents that were offered a newsletter featuring Fox News
articles. “Treatment” is a binary variable taking value one if the articles in the newsletter are fact-checked. “Accuracy” of the
newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very inaccurate” to “Very accurate”. “Trust” is the trustworthiness of the
newsletter and measured on a 5-point scale from “Not trustworthy at all” to “Very trustworthy”. “Quality” of the newsletter is
measured on a 5-point scale from “Very low quality” to “Very high quality”. “Left-wing bias” is measured on a 5-point scale
from “Very right-wing biased” to “Very left-wing biased”. “Complexity” of the newsletter articles is measured on a 5-point
scale from “Very simple” to “Very complex”. “Entertainment” of the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Not
entertaining at all” to “Very entertaining”.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Section A provides additional theoretical results.
Section B contains additional tables. Table B.1 provides an overview of the four
experimental waves. Table B.2 provides summary statistics for demographic variables
by wave. Table B.3, Table B.4, Table B.5, Table B.6, Table B.7, Table B.8, Table B.9 and
Table B.10 provide balance tests for our treatment manipulations based on observables.
Table B.11 shows treatment effects for the politically aligned outlet for respondents
with moderate and strong views. Table B.12 shows treatment effects for the politically
non-aligned outlet for respondents with moderate and strong views. Table B.13 shows
treatment effects for the politically non-aligned outlet for respondents with moderate
and strong views including inattentive ones. Table B.14 shows interaction effects
between our base treatment and our additional treatments for attentive and inattentive
respondents. Table B.15 shows interaction effects between our base treatment and our
additional treatments by wave. Table B.16 shows treatment effects on expected errors.
Table B.17 shows differences in covariates between respondents who signed up for the
newsletter and those who did not.
Section C contains additional figures. Figure C.1 provides a screenshot of the key
treatment screens. Figure C.2 shows the distribution of beliefs about factual errors
and trust in our ability to fact-check news articles from the politically aligned outlet
Figure C.3 shows the distribution of beliefs about factual errors and trust in our ability
to fact-check news articles from the politically non-aligned outlet (wave 3). Figure C.4
shows the distribution of beliefs about factual errors and trust in our ability to fact-
check news articles among respondents who passed the attention check. Figure C.5
shows the distribution of beliefs about factual errors and trust in our ability to fact-
check news articles by respondent’s ideology and the news outlet. Figure C.6 shows
the distribution of beliefs about different newsletter characteristics by ideology and
news outlet. Figure C.7 shows the evolution of demand for our newsletter over time.
Figure C.8 shows the results from simultaneously interacting our main treatment with
respondent ideology and a vector of controls for the politically aligned outlet. Figure C.9
shows the results from simultaneously interacting our main treatment with respondent
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ideology and a vector of controls for the politically non-aligned outlet. Figure C.10
shows the distribution of expert forecasts. Figure C.11 and Figure C.12 show correlates
of the demand for news from MSNBC and Fox News, respectively.
Section D provides further details about the newsletter and our fact-checking efforts,
including an example of how our newsletter looked like.
Section E provides screenshots of the experimental instructions.
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A Additional theoretical results
This section provides a more detailed derivation of the prediction that the effect of
fact-checking on the demand for news should be positive for politically non-aligned
outlets. Recall that the politically non-aligned outlet reports R if θ = R and, if θ = L
reports R with probability p. Suppose the agent decides to read the newsletter. In this
case, we can derive her posterior belief q̂(n) that θ = L from Bayes’ rule:
q̂(n) =
1 if n = Lqp
1−q+pq if n = R
(6)
The agent will find it optimal to choose a = R after reading n = R only if q̂(R) ≤ 12 ,
which is the case if (1+ p)q≤ 1.
Case 1: (1+ p)q ≤ 1. In this case, the agent’s action will match the state whenever
n = θ , which happens with probability 1−q+q(1− p). Relative to always choosing
a = L, the newsletter provides instrumental utility of uI = α(1− q+ q(1− p)), and
non-instrumental utility of βq(1− p). Now, fact-checking will increase the instrumental
value by αqp and the non-instrumental utility by βqp. In total, the agent’s valuation
increases by ∆u = (α +β )qp.
Case 2: (1+ p)q > 1. In this case, the agent will always choose L. Thus, the instru-
mental value of the newsletter is uI = 0. Thus, while the effect of fact-checking on
the non-instrumental utility is identical to the previous case, fact-checking will now
increase the instrumental value of the newsletter by α(1−q) because it is now optimal
to choose a = n. Thus, the total change in the agent’s valuation is
∆u = α(1−q)+βqp = (α +β )+α(1− (1+ p)q), (7)
where the last term is positive in the case considered.
Thus, we have shown that for politically non-aligned outlets, the effect of fact-
checking on the agent’s valuation of a newsletter is positive and given by
∆uopposed = (α +β )+α max{0,1− (1+ p)q}. (8)
3
B Additional tables
Table B.1: Overview of experimental waves
Wave Sample Date Extra treatments Pre-analysis plan
Wave 1 n = 2,086 Jan 21–22 Non-polarized topic AsPredicted #56307
Wave 2 n = 2,097 Jan 22–26 Instrumental value AsPredicted #56397
Wave 3 n = 2,054 Feb 15–16 Right-wing outlet AsPredicted #58344
Wave 4 n = 2,162 Feb 16–18 Commentary AsPredicted #58468
Note: This table provides an overview of the four experimental waves. All four waves feature the
two base treatments (demand for Biden Rescue Plan with or without fact-check). In addition, each
wave has an extra set of treatments.
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Table B.2: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full sample Attentive Inattentive Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Male 0.440 0.400 0.488 0.418 0.474 0.455 0.414
Age 40.033 43.267 35.989 38.894 40.509 43.789 37.101
White 0.661 0.765 0.530 0.683 0.675 0.683 0.604
Log income 10.754 10.834 10.654 10.776 10.769 10.746 10.726
College education 0.810 0.864 0.742 0.811 0.803 0.822 0.805
Full-time work 0.481 0.447 0.524 0.495 0.485 0.424 0.519
Northeast 0.235 0.229 0.242 0.241 0.221 0.227 0.250
Midwest 0.228 0.225 0.230 0.221 0.224 0.258 0.208
West 0.198 0.221 0.169 0.196 0.221 0.177 0.198
South 0.340 0.324 0.359 0.342 0.334 0.337 0.345
Observations 8,399 4,667 3,732 2,086 2,097 2,054 2,162
Note: This table displays the mean value of basic covariates for the full sample (column 1), attentive
respondents (column 2), inattentive respondents (column 3), and separately for each wave (columns
4–7). “Male” is a binary variable with value one for male respondents. “Age” is age of the respon-
dent. “White” is a binary variable with value one if the respondent selected “Caucasian/White”.
“Log income” is coded continuously as the log of the income bracket’s midpoint (Less than $15,000,
$15,000 to $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to
$149,999, $150,000 to $200,000, $200,000 or more). “College education” is a binary dummy vari-
able taking value one if the respondent selected “Some college, no degree”, “Associates degree”,
“Bachelor’s degree”, or “Post-graduate degree”. “Full-time work” is a binary dummy variable taking
value one if the respondent is working full-time. “Northeast”, “Midwest”, “West” and “South” are
binary dummy variables with value one if the respondent lives in the respective region.
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Table B.3: Test of balance: Treatment vs. control
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Male 0.44 0.44 0.639 8399
Age 40.08 39.98 0.790 8399
Log of income 10.75 10.76 0.858 8399
South 0.33 0.35 0.182 8399
West 0.20 0.20 0.857 8399
Northeast 0.24 0.23 0.065 8399
White 0.65 0.67 0.231 8399
College 0.81 0.81 0.946 8399
Note: This table provides a balance test for the fact-checking treatment using ob-
servations from all waves. “Male” is a binary variable with value one for male
respondents. “Age” is coded as the continuous midpoint of the age bracket (18
to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 or older). “Log of income” is
coded continuously as the logarithm of the income bracket’s midpoint (Less
than $15,000, $15,000 to $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999,
$75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 to $200,000, $200,000
or more). “South”, “West”, and “Northeast” are binary dummy variables with
value one if the respondent lives in the respective region. “White” is a binary
variable with value one if the respondent selected “Caucasian/White”. “Col-
lege education” is a binary dummy variable taking value one if the respondent
selected “Some college, no degree”, “Associates degree”, “Bachelor’s degree”,
or “Post-graduate degree”.
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Table B.4: Test of balance for attentive respondents: Treatment vs. control
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Male 0.40 0.40 0.663 4667
Age 43.31 43.22 0.851 4667
Log of income 10.85 10.82 0.168 4667
South 0.32 0.33 0.227 4667
West 0.22 0.22 0.587 4667
Northeast 0.24 0.22 0.024 4667
White 0.76 0.77 0.392 4667
College 0.87 0.86 0.576 4667
Note: This table provides a balance test for the fact-checking treatment using
attentive respondents from all waves. “Male” is a binary variable with value
one for male respondents. “Age” is coded as the continuous midpoint of the
age bracket (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 or older). “Log
of income” is coded continuously as the logarithm of the income bracket’s mid-
point (Less than $15,000, $15,000 to $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to
$74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 to $200,000,
$200,000 or more). “South”, “West”, and “Northeast” are binary dummy vari-
ables with value one if the respondent lives in the respective region. “White” is
a binary variable with value one if the respondent selected “Caucasian/White”.
“College education” is a binary dummy variable taking value one if the respon-
dent selected “Some college, no degree”, “Associates degree”, “Bachelor’s
degree”, or “Post-graduate degree”.
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Table B.5: Test of balance for attentive respondents with a strong ideology:
Treatment vs. control
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Male 0.43 0.38 0.054 1471
Age 40.54 40.26 0.737 1471
Log of income 10.84 10.80 0.405 1471
South 0.34 0.31 0.152 1471
West 0.22 0.21 0.621 1471
Northeast 0.25 0.25 0.822 1471
White 0.76 0.78 0.438 1471
College 0.87 0.87 0.849 1471
Note: This table provides a balance test for the fact-checking treatment using
attentive respondents with a strong ideology from all waves. “Male” is a binary
variable with value one for male respondents. “Age” is coded as the continuous
midpoint of the age bracket (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64,
65 or older). “Log of income” is coded continuously as the logarithm of the
income bracket’s midpoint (Less than $15,000, $15,000 to $24,999, $25,000
to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999,
$150,000 to $200,000, $200,000 or more). “South”, “West”, and “Northeast”
are binary dummy variables with value one if the respondent lives in the re-
spective region. “White” is a binary variable with value one if the respondent
selected “Caucasian/White”. “College education” is a binary dummy variable
taking value one if the respondent selected “Some college, no degree”, “Asso-
ciates degree”, “Bachelor’s degree”, or “Post-graduate degree”.
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Table B.6: Test of balance for attentive respondents with a moderate ideol-
ogy: Treatment vs. control
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Male 0.39 0.40 0.428 3196
Age 44.63 44.54 0.894 3196
Log of income 10.86 10.83 0.265 3196
South 0.30 0.34 0.015 3196
West 0.22 0.22 0.744 3196
Northeast 0.24 0.20 0.004 3196
White 0.76 0.77 0.608 3196
College 0.87 0.86 0.428 3196
Note: This table provides a balance test for the fact-checking treatment using
attentive respondents with a moderate ideology from all waves. “Male” is a
binary variable with value one for male respondents. “Age” is coded as the
continuous midpoint of the age bracket (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54,
55 to 64, 65 or older). “Log of income” is coded continuously as the logarithm
of the income bracket’s midpoint (Less than $15,000, $15,000 to $24,999,
$25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to
$149,999, $150,000 to $200,000, $200,000 or more). “South”, “West”, and
“Northeast” are binary dummy variables with value one if the respondent lives
in the respective region. “White” is a binary variable with value one if the re-
spondent selected “Caucasian/White”. “College education” is a binary dummy
variable taking value one if the respondent selected “Some college, no degree”,
“Associates degree”, “Bachelor’s degree”, or “Post-graduate degree”.
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Table B.7: Test of balance: Neutral versus polarized framing
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Male 0.42 0.41 0.690 2086
Age 38.62 39.17 0.426 2086
Log of income 10.75 10.81 0.108 2086
South 0.36 0.33 0.097 2086
West 0.19 0.20 0.741 2086
Northeast 0.23 0.25 0.357 2086
White 0.68 0.69 0.707 2086
College 0.82 0.80 0.434 2086
Note: This table provides a balance test for neutral and polarized framing of
the policy proposal using respondents from wave 1. “Male” is a binary vari-
able with value one for male respondents. “Age” is coded as the continuous
midpoint of the age bracket (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64,
65 or older). “Log of income” is coded continuously as the logarithm of the
income bracket’s midpoint (Less than $15,000, $15,000 to $24,999, $25,000
to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999,
$150,000 to $200,000, $200,000 or more). “South”, “West”, and “Northeast”
are binary dummy variables with value one if the respondent lives in the re-
spective region. “White” is a binary variable with value one if the respondent
selected “Caucasian/White”. “College education” is a binary dummy variable
taking value one if the respondent selected “Some college, no degree”, “Asso-
ciates degree”, “Bachelor’s degree”, or “Post-graduate degree”.
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Table B.8: Test of balance: High versus low instrumental value
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Male 0.46 0.49 0.232 2097
Age 41.33 39.69 0.027 2097
Log of income 10.75 10.78 0.439 2097
South 0.33 0.34 0.829 2097
West 0.22 0.22 0.756 2097
Northeast 0.22 0.22 0.748 2097
White 0.69 0.66 0.088 2097
College 0.80 0.80 0.870 2097
Note: This table provides a balance test for instrumental value treatment using
respondents from wave 2. “Male” is a binary variable with value one for male
respondents. “Age” is coded as the continuous midpoint of the age bracket (18
to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 or older). “Log of income” is
coded continuously as the logarithm of the income bracket’s midpoint (Less
than $15,000, $15,000 to $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999,
$75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 to $200,000, $200,000
or more). “South”, “West”, and “Northeast” are binary dummy variables with
value one if the respondent lives in the respective region. “White” is a binary
variable with value one if the respondent selected “Caucasian/White”. “Col-
lege education” is a binary dummy variable taking value one if the respondent
selected “Some college, no degree”, “Associates degree”, “Bachelor’s degree”,
or “Post-graduate degree”.
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Table B.9: Test of balance: Fox News versus MSNBC
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Male 0.48 0.43 0.046 2054
Age 44.06 43.52 0.515 2054
Log of income 10.75 10.74 0.692 2054
South 0.35 0.33 0.446 2054
West 0.18 0.18 0.833 2054
Northeast 0.22 0.24 0.358 2054
White 0.69 0.68 0.682 2054
College 0.82 0.82 0.789 2054
Note: This table provides a balance test for the Fox News versusMSNBC treat-
ment using respondents from wave 3. “Male” is a binary variable with value
one for male respondents. “Age” is coded as the continuous midpoint of the
age bracket (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 or older). “Log
of income” is coded continuously as the logarithm of the income bracket’s mid-
point (Less than $15,000, $15,000 to $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to
$74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 to $200,000,
$200,000 or more). “South”, “West”, and “Northeast” are binary dummy vari-
ables with value one if the respondent lives in the respective region. “White” is
a binary variable with value one if the respondent selected “Caucasian/White”.
“College education” is a binary dummy variable taking value one if the respon-
dent selected “Some college, no degree”, “Associates degree”, “Bachelor’s
degree”, or “Post-graduate degree”.
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Table B.10: Test of balance: Opinion versus news
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Male 0.41 0.41 0.918 2162
Age 36.66 37.55 0.192 2162
Log of income 10.72 10.73 0.851 2162
South 0.35 0.34 0.375 2162
West 0.19 0.21 0.285 2162
Northeast 0.25 0.25 0.691 2162
White 0.60 0.61 0.647 2162
College 0.81 0.80 0.966 2162
Note: This table provides a balance test for the opinion versus news section vari-
ation using respondents from wave 4. “Male” is a binary variable with value
one for male respondents. “Age” is coded as the continuous midpoint of the
age bracket (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 or older). “Log
of income” is coded continuously as the logarithm of the income bracket’s mid-
point (Less than $15,000, $15,000 to $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to
$74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 to $200,000,
$200,000 or more). “South”, “West”, and “Northeast” are binary dummy vari-
ables with value one if the respondent lives in the respective region. “White” is
a binary variable with value one if the respondent selected “Caucasian/White”.
“College education” is a binary dummy variable taking value one if the respon-
dent selected “Some college, no degree”, “Associates degree”, “Bachelor’s
degree”, or “Post-graduate degree”.
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Table B.11: Heterogeneous treatment effects between respondents with strong and moderate views: MSNBC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
News demand Accuracy Trust Quality Left-wing bias Complexity Entertainment
Panel A: Strong ideology
Treatment (a) -0.024 0.077** -0.012 -0.014 -0.041 -0.040 -0.008
(0.018) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
N 2,592 2,571 2,571 2,571 2,571 2,571 2,571
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.657 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B: Moderate ideology
Treatment (b) 0.019 0.068** 0.037 0.043 -0.010 0.044 0.008
(0.014) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
N 4,779 4,723 4,723 4,723 4,723 4,723 4,723
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.500 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value: a = b 0.062 0.745 0.320 0.254 0.435 0.089 0.731
Note: This table uses data from all respondents (including inattentive ones) and shows OLS regression estimates where the de-
pendent variables are demand for the newsletter and different post-treatment beliefs about the newsletter. All regressions use
respondents that were offered a newsletter featuring MSNBC articles. “Treatment” is a binary variable taking value one if the
articles in the newsletter are fact-checked. “Accuracy” of the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very inaccurate” to
“Very accurate”. “Trust” is the trustworthiness of the newsletter and measured on a 5-point scale from “Not trustworthy at all” to
“Very trustworthy”. “Quality” of the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very low quality” to “Very high quality”.
“Left-wing bias” is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very right-wing biased” to “Very left-wing biased”. “Complexity” of the
newsletter articles is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very simple” to “Very complex”. “Entertainment” of the newsletter is
measured on a 5-point scale from “Not entertaining at all” to “Very entertaining”.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.12: Heterogeneous treatment effects between attentive respondents with strong and moderate views:
Fox News
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
News demand Accuracy Trust Quality Left-wing bias Complexity Entertainment
Panel A: Strong ideology
Treatment (a) 0.064 0.195 0.117 0.227 -0.208 -0.035 0.265
(0.079) (0.158) (0.163) (0.172) (0.151) (0.159) (0.176)
N 164 163 163 163 163 163 163
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.384 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B: Moderate ideology
Treatment (b) 0.095* 0.224** 0.141 0.147 -0.062 -0.081 0.022
(0.049) (0.101) (0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.102) (0.096)
N 394 385 385 385 385 385 385
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.329 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value: a = b 0.732 0.953 0.973 0.637 0.381 0.826 0.202
Note: This table uses data from attentive respondents and shows OLS regression estimates where the dependent variables are
demand for the newsletter and different post-treatment beliefs about the newsletter. All regressions use respondents that were
offered a newsletter featuring Fox News artices. “Treatment” is a binary variable taking value one if the articles in the newsletter
are fact-checked. “Accuracy” of the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very inaccurate” to “Very accurate”. “Quality”
of the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very low quality” to “Very high quality”. “Trust” is the trustworthiness of
the newsletter and measured on a 5-point scale from “Not trustworthy at all” to “Very trustworthy”. “Complexity” of the newsletter
articles is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very simple” to “Very complex”. “Entertainment” of the newsletter is measured on a
5-point scale from “Not entertaining at all” to “Very entertaining”. “Left-wing bias” is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very
right-wing biased” to “Very left-wing biased”.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.13: Heterogeneous treatment effects between respondents with strong and moderate views: Fox News
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
News demand Accuracy Trust Quality Left-wing bias Complexity Entertainment
Panel A: Strong ideology
Treatment (a) 0.099* 0.167 0.182* 0.241** -0.144 -0.124 0.173*
(0.052) (0.104) (0.103) (0.107) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
N 329 328 328 328 328 328 328
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.548 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B: Moderate ideology
Treatment (b) 0.062* 0.157** 0.151** 0.146** -0.127* -0.089 0.120
(0.037) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.078) (0.074)
N 699 682 682 682 682 682 682
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.402 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value: a = b 0.560 0.749 0.659 0.376 0.773 0.696 0.540
Note: This table uses data from all respondents (including inattentive ones) and shows OLS regression estimates where the dependent
variables are demand for the newsletter and different post-treatment beliefs about the newsletter. All regressions use respondents
that were offered a newsletter featuring Fox News articles. “Treatment” is a binary variable taking value one if the articles in
the newsletter are fact-checked. “Accuracy” of the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very inaccurate” to “Very
accurate”. “Quality” of the newsletter is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very low quality” to “Very high quality”. “Trust” is the
trustworthiness of the newsletter and measured on a 5-point scale from “Not trustworthy at all” to “Very trustworthy”. “Complexity”
of the newsletter articles is measured on a 5-point scale from “Very simple” to “Very complex”. “Entertainment” of the newsletter is
measured on a 5-point scale from “Not entertaining at all” to “Very entertaining”. “Left-wing bias” is measured on a 5-point scale
from “Very right-wing biased” to “Very left-wing biased”.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.14: Interaction analysis: Base versus extra treatments
Interactant:









Panel A: Attentive respondents
Treatment 0.026 0.027* 0.029* 0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Treatment × Interactant -0.017 -0.028 -0.060 0.081*
(0.042) (0.043) (0.048) (0.044)
Interactant 0.020 -0.016 0.029 -0.145***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.035)
N 4,667 4,667 4,667 4,667
Control group mean 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491
Panel B: Inattentive
Treatment -0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Treatment × Interactant 0.009 -0.012 -0.039 0.057
(0.050) (0.049) (0.042) (0.046)
Interactant -0.033 -0.003 0.081** -0.083**
(0.042) (0.039) (0.036) (0.039)
N 3,732 3,732 3,732 3,732
Control group mean 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625
Note: This table shows OLS regression where the dependent variable is demand for the newsletter.
We pool respondents across waves. “Treatment” is a binary variable taking value one if the articles
in the newsletter are fact-checked (base treatment). In each column, we interact the base treatment
with a different additional treatment. The interactants are binary variables taking value one if a
respondent was assigned to the condition of the additional treatment that differed from the base
experiment. In each column, we include indicator variables for the additional treatments that are not
explored in the interaction analysis.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.15: Interaction of the base treatment and the additional treatments
Interactant:









Treatment (a) -0.024 0.011 0.019 0.032
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Treatment × Interactant (b) 0.032 -0.023 -0.039 0.043
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Interactant -0.016 -0.018 0.056* -0.102***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
N 2,086 2,097 2,162 2,054
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.552 0.570 0.549 0.532
P-value: a + b = 0 0.783 0.702 0.481 0.013
Note: This table shows OLS regression where the dependent variable is demand for the newsletter.
Each column uses only observations from that particular wave, i.e, column k uses respondents from
wave k. “Treatment” is a binary variable taking value one if the articles in the newsletter are fact-
checked (base treatment). In each column, we interact the base treatment with the additional treat-
ment in that particular wave. The interactants are binary variables taking value one if a respondent
was assigned to the condition of the additional treatment that differed from the base experiment.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.16: Treatment effect on expected errors
Full sample Attentive respondents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MSNBC Fox News MSNBC Fox News
Treatment -0.066*** -0.127* -0.120*** -0.264***
(0.023) (0.070) (0.029) (0.097)
N 7,236 996 4,039 539
Z-scored No No No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 1.072 1.900 0.906 2.152
Note: This table shows OLS regression where the dependent variable are the respondent’s expectation
about the number of articles that contain factual inaccuracies in reporting, which can range from 0 to
3. “Treatment” is a binary variable taking value one if the articles in the newsletter are fact-checked
(base treatment). Columns 1 and 3 use respondents that were offered a newsletter featuring MSNBC
articles, while columns 2 and 4 those that were offered a newsletter featuring Fox News articles.
Columns 3 and 4 restrict to the subsample of attentive respondents.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
19
Table B.17: Selection
Newsletter demand No newsletter demand P-value Observations
Male 0.47 0.38 0.000 3673
Age 39.34 39.52 0.751 3673
Log of income 10.81 10.71 0.001 3673
South 0.34 0.35 0.868 3673
West 0.19 0.21 0.074 3673
Northeast 0.25 0.20 0.000 3673
White 0.64 0.70 0.000 3673
College 0.82 0.80 0.344 3673
Note: This table shows the characteristics of respondents who signed up for the newsletter
(“Newsletter demand”) and those who did not (“No newsletter demand”) among con-
trol group respondents who were offered the newsletter featuring articles from MSNBC.
“Male” is a binary variable with value one for male respondents. “Age” is coded as the
continuous midpoint of the age bracket (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to
64, 65 or older). “Log of income” is coded continuously as the logarithm of the in-
come bracket’s midpoint (Less than $15,000, $15,000 to $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999,
$50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 to $200,000,
$200,000 or more). “South”, “West”, and “Northeast” are binary dummy variables with
value one if the respondent lives in the respective region. “White” is a binary variable
with value one if the respondent selected “Caucasian/White”. “College education” is a
binary dummy variable taking value one if the respondent selected “Some college, no




Figure C.1: Experimental instructions: Politics newsletter
(a) Newsletter: Control group
(b) Newsletter: Treatment group
Note: These figures provides the experimental instructions used to describe the politics newsletter to respondents in the control group (Panel A)
and in the treatment group (Panel B) for the case of a politically aligned outlet. The original instructions did not include the red highlighting
in Panel B. For the politically non-aligned outlet, we replaced MSNBC with Fox News.
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Figure C.2: Expected factual errors and trust in fact-checking: MSNBC
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Note: This figure uses data from control group respondents (n = 3,673). Panel C.2a shows
the distribution of responses to the question “How many of the top three articles from
MSNBC selected for the newsletter do you expect to contain factual errors?” Panel C.2b
shows the distribution of responses to the question “How much do you trust our ability to
fact check articles from MSNBC?”
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Note: This figure uses data from control group respondents in wave 3. Panel C.3a shows
the distribution of responses to the following question: “How many of the top three articles
from FOX selected for the newsletter do you expect to contain factual errors?” Panel C.3b
shows distribution of responses to the following question: “How much do you trust our
ability to fact check articles from Fox News?”
24
Figure C.4: Expected factual errors and trust in fact-checking: Attentive respondents
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Note: This figure uses data from control group respondents who passed the attention check.
Panel C.4a shows the distribution of responses to the question “How many of the top three
articles from MSNBC selected for the newsletter do you expect to contain factual errors?”
Panel C.4b shows the distribution of responses to the question “How much do you trust
our ability to fact check articles from MSNBC?” Panel C.4c and Panel C.4d show the
corresponding figures for Fox News.
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Figure C.5: Expected factual errors and trust in fact-checking ability separately by
ideology
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Note: This figure uses data from control group respondents who passed the attention check.
Panel C.5a shows the distribution of responses to the question “How many of the top three
articles from MSNBC selected for the newsletter do you expect to contain factual errors?”
Panel C.5b shows the distribution of responses to the question “How much do you trust
our ability to fact check articles from MSNBC?” Panel C.5c and Panel C.5d show the
corresponding figures for Fox News.
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Moderate ideology Strong ideology Total
MSNBC Fox News
Note: This figure uses data from control group respondents who passed the attention check.
Figure C.6a shows the distribution of responses to the question “How accurate do you expect
the newsletter to be?”. Figure C.6b shows the distribution of responses to the question “What
quality would you expect the newsletter to have?”. Figure C.6c shows the distribution of
responses to the question “What kind of political bias do you expect the newsletter to have?”.
Figure C.6d shows the distribution of responses to the question “How entertaining do you
expect the newsletter to be?”. Each panel separately shows the distribution of responses for
respondents with a strong ideology, moderate ideology and the full sample.
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Note: This figure uses data from control group respondents in the base treatment who passed
the attention check. The vertical bars indicate the fraction of respondents who signed up for
the newsletter. 95 percent confidence intervals are indicated.
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Figure C.8: Heterogeneity in treatment effects on newsletter demand with MSNBC:
Simultaneous interactions
Treatment x Strong ideology
Treatment x Income (above median)
Treatment x Male
Treatment x Age (above median)
Treatment x Employment
Treatment x College
Treatment x non-Hispanic white
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Note: This figure plots interaction coefficients (β2) from a regression including our fact-
check treatment, a vector of demographic controls and their interaction with the treatment
indicator, i.e., a regression of the form y = β0 + β1Tr+ β2Tr×Xi + β3Xi + εi where Xi
is a vector of demographic variables. 95 percent confidence intervals are indicated. The
regression includes respondents who passed the attention check and were offered a newsletter
featuring articles from MSNBC. “Strong ideology” is a binary variable taking value one for
respondents with a strong ideology. “Income (above median)” is a binary variable taking
value one if a respondent has above-median income. “Male” is a binary variable taking
value one if a respondent is male. “Age (above median)” is a binary variable taking value
one if a respondent has above-median age. “Employment” is a binary variable taking value
one if a respondent is working full-time. “College” is a binary variable taking value one if a
respondent has at least some college experience. “non-Hispanic White” is a binary variable
taking value one if a respondent selected “Caucasian/White” and is of non-Hispanic origin.
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Treatment x Age (above median)
Treatment x Strong ideology
Treatment x Income (above median)
Treatment x Male
Treatment x non-Hispanic white
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Note: This figure plots interaction coefficients (β2) from a regression including our fact-
check treatment, a vector of demographic controls and their interaction with the treatment
indicator, i.e., a regression of the form y = β0 + β1Tr+ β2Tr×Xi + β3Xi + εi where Xi
is a vector of demographic variables. 95 percent confidence intervals are indicated. The
regression includes respondents who passed the attention check and were offered a newsletter
featuring articles from Fox News. “Strong ideology” is a binary variable taking value one
for respondents with a strong ideology. “Income (above median)” is a binary variable taking
value one if a respondent has above-median income. “Male” is a binary variable taking
value one if a respondent is male. “Age (above median)” is a binary variable taking value
one if a respondent has above-median age. “Employment” is a binary variable taking value
one if a respondent is working full-time. “College” is a binary variable taking value one if a
respondent has at least some college experience. “non-Hispanic White” is a binary variable
taking value one if a respondent selected “Caucasian/White” and is of non-Hispanic origin.
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Figure C.10: Expert survey
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Note: This figure uses data from the expert survey. Panel C.10a shows the distribution of
beliefs about treatment effects for MSNBC (left histogram) and Fox News (right histogram).
Panel C.10b shows the mean expert forecast of the treatment effects for MSNBC and Fox
News contrasted with the actual treatment effects from the main experiment (estimated
without controls but with wave fixed effects). 95 percent confidence intervals are indicated.
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-.05 0 .05 .1
Newsletter demand
Note: This figure plots the correlations between newsletter demand and a battery of z-scored
beliefs about the newsletter from a joint regression that also controls for demographic
characteristics. We use control group respondents that were offered a newsletter featuring
articles from MSNBC. 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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-.1 0 .1 .2
Newsletter demand
Note: This figure plots the correlations between newsletter demand and a battery of z-scored
beliefs about the newsletter from a joint regression that also controls for demographic
characteristics. We use control group respondents that were offered a newsletter featuring
articles from Fox News. 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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D Fact-checking
While we did not explicitly reveal to our respondents how we selected the top three
stories, in practice we used Google News to identify the top three stories about the
Biden Rescue Plan from MSNBC and Fox News. We then employed two complementary
approaches to fact-check the veracity of information contained in featured articles. First,
we fact-checked the articles using the following steps:
• Identify whether a similar news articles appeared in other high-quality outlets
(e.g. Reuters). Then search for inconsistencies across these article.
• Identify the primary source of statistical information, assess whether they are
accurately represented, and compare the figures to estimates from other, high-
quality sources (e.g. government reports, published studies).
• Identify the primary source of quotations and assess whether they are quoted out
of context.
Second, we collected information on inaccurate claims from well-known fact-checking
organizations to rule out that we missed already identified false claims. Below we
provide two examples of false claims.
MSNBC On March 12, 2021, MSNBC published the article “Dems’ COVID relief
package already saving tens of thousands of jobs”. In this article, the author claims
that independent economic forecasts have “projected the law may create as many as
7 million jobs.”, citing a projection by Gregory Daco. This is misleading because the
projection includes both the effect of the fiscal stimulus as well as improving economic
conditions. This example illustrates how the ideologically aligned outlet biased their
reports towards the beliefs of their readers by making exaggerated claims about the
positive consequences of the stimulus plan.
Fox News On March 7, 2021, Fox News published the article “Sen. Blackburn on
massive coronavirus package heading to House without GOP support.” This article
focuses on the critique of Senator Marsha Blackburn that “only nine percent” of the
spending involved in the stimulus plan is related to fighting the coronavirus. While
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spending on vaccines and other medical supplies accounts for about nine percent, the
stimulus plan also includes financial relief for households affected by the pandemic.
Below is a screenshot of the website where we published our newsletter.
Figure D.1: Newsletter about the Biden Rescue Plan
Note: This is a screenshot of the website where we published our newsletter.
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E Screenshots









E.1.2 Newsletter without fact-checking
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E.1.3 Newsletter with fact-checking
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E.1.5 Beliefs about fact-checking: condition 1
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E.1.6 Beliefs about fact-checking: condition 2
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E.1.7 Demand for fact-checking information
E.1.8 Questions about the Biden Rescue Plan
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E.2 Wave 1: Topic polarization
E.2.1 Newsletter without fact-checking
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E.2.2 Newsletter with fact-checking
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E.3 Wave 2: Instrumental motives
E.3.1 Newsletter without fact-checking
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E.3.2 Newsletter with fact-checking
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E.4 Manipulation checks for instrumental motives
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E.5 Wave 3: Right-wing outlet
E.5.1 Newsletter without fact-checking
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E.5.2 Newsletter with fact-checking
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E.6 Wave 4: Opinion piece
E.6.1 Newsletter without fact-checking
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E.6.2 Newsletter with fact-checking
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